



Monetary policy has been a central element of
almost all analyses of business cycles during the
past twenty years. Many analysts claim that fluc-
tuation in the growth rates of monetary aggre-
gates is the dominant cause of cycles in real
economic activity and in the rate of inflation.
This view was most forcefully argued by Milton
Friedman and Anna Schwartz in their Monetary
History of the United States 1867-1960.
Recently, however, economists have seen a
revival of interest in the role played by real, or
nonmonetary, events in causing business cycles.
The general agreement that oil and food supply
shocks were the primary causes of the 1974-75
recession gave impetus to that revival. And,
more recently, the effects ofthe sharp decline in
oil prices on major sectors of the economy have
added more support to the arguments of real
business cycle theorists.
This Letter reviews two contributions of real
business cycle theories: their explanation of how
"real" shocks in one or more sectors of the
economy can generate output and employment
movements across all sectors and through time
- the hallmarks of business cycles; and their
explanation of the relationship between mone-
tary aggregates and real GNP, which is contrary
to views that link business cycles mainly to
monetary causes.
Real shocks to output
Real business cycle theories stress that non-
monetary factors such as population growth,
technological innovation, and consumer prefer-
ences determine the trend for the real growth
rate of an economy. According to the theories,
prices and wages constantly adjust when short-
ages or surpluses occur in any markets; and
these adjustments serve to keep the economy
close to its trend growth. In this context, busi-
ness cycles arise when real shocks change the
economy's productivity or wealth, and upset the
economy's equilibrium.
Real shockscantakeavarietyofformsi such as
the disruption in oil supplies in the 1970s, the
decline in oil prices in 1986, shifts in demand
from one sector of the economy to another, fis-
cal policy changes, or a technological change
such as the development of computer micro-
chips. Strikes and changes in productivity (out-
put per worker) in specific industries are further
examples, as are shifts in household attitudes
toward saving or working.
Existing real business cycle theories have
focused mainly on disturbances to the supply
side of the economy as the cause of economic
fluctuations. These disturbances set in motion
economy-wide adjustments in consumption,
production, labor supply, and saving that
ultimately re-establish a new equilibrium.
In contrast, traditional theories attribute cycles to
the slow adjustment of wages and prices, which
they claim prevents the economy from maintain-
ing its equilibrium growth path. Real business
cycle theorists, such as Edward Prescott of the
University of Minneapolis, Finn Kydland of Car-
negie-Mellon, and Robert King, John Long, and
Charles Plosser ofthe University of Rochester,
argue that the apparent sluggishness of some
prices and wages is not sufficient to prevent the
economy from remaining close to its trend
growth. From their perspective, fluctuations in
real economic activity must be due to changes
in the real, nonmonetary factors that determine
trend growth.
Causing business cycles
To understand better how "real" shocks can
cause business cycles according to real business
cycle theories, suppose there is a temporary
decline in one sector's productivity. The decline
reduces real income in that sector, and leads
individuals who earn their living in that sector to
reduce their consumption of goods and services
produced by their own and all other sectors. In
this way, the initial shock spreads to other
sectors.FRBSF
However, people do not immediately reduce
their current consumption by the full amount of
the temporary decline in their real income.
Instead, they spread the effect of the real income
reduction over time by cutting back both their
planned consumption and their planned saving.
As a resuIt, it takes time for the economyto
work its way out of the repercussions of the ini-
tial shock.
The decline in output induced by the initial tem-
porary drop in productivity leads firms to want
fewer workers atthe going wage. The resulting
slack in the labor market then causes workers
promptly to lower their wage demands in an
effort to get the relatively scarce jobs. Since,
according to real business cycle theories, wages
adjust readily to market pressures, real wages-
wages adjusted for the cost of living- would
fall temporarily. Real business cycle theories
therefore predict that real wages move in the
same direction as real output.
Voluntary unemployment
The effect on employment depends on the
response of individuals to the temporary fluctua-
tion in real wages. Workers may respond to the
temporary decline in real wages in two ways.
They could react to the resulting decline in their
real income by working more. However, since
the return to working (the wage) would be
lower, workers also might respond by working
fewer hours and enjoying more time off.
Real business cycle theorists assume the latter
response dominates, and that it can take a vari-
ety of forms. Employed workers might reduce
their hours of work by limitingovertime hours or
by quitting second jobs. Individuals who had
been unemployed and looking for work may, in
response to lower real wages, spend more time
searching for a job, or they may stop searching
altogether and drop out ofthe labor force. Such
individuals perceive the benefits (such as a
higher paying job) from more extensive job
search, or from leisure, to outweigh the net gain
from working at the temporarily lower real
wage. Thus, the supply of labor falls in response
to the temporary decline in real wages.
By assuming that wages respond readily to
changes in labor supply and demand, real busi-
ness cycle theories leave no room for involun-
tary unemployment. They claim that the cyclical
variation in employment reflects movements in
labor supply, i.e., changes in the labor force.
Thus,all cyclical unemployment in existing real
business cycle theories is voluntary.
Empirical observations, however, do not support
this claim. Experience in the United States dem-
onstrates that most ofthe cyclical variation in
employment is due to changes in the employ-
ment rate - the fraction of the labor force
employed - rather than changes in the labor
force itself or in the number of hours each
worker works. This is especially true during
recession years, when very little of the decline in
total employment is explained by reductions in
the measured labor force. For the recent reces-
sion year of 1982, for example, only about 3
percent ofthe total decline in employment can
be attributed to reductions in the labor force.
Instead, changes in the demand for labor, caus-
ing involuntary unemployment, may account for
most of the cyclical variation in employment-
contrary to real business cycle theories. Real
wage changes may affect some individuals'
decisions about whether to work, and how
many hours, but they seem to account for little
of the fluctuation in total employment that
characterizes a business cycle.
Real business cycle theorists do have an explan-
ation for this anomaly. They assert that existing
unemployment statistics do not correspond cor-
rectly to the economic concept of unemploy-
ment and, as a result, count people who are
voluntarily unemployed. The theorists claim that
many workers now counted as unemployed
should not be counted in the labor force at all.
These include people who are not willing to
work at going wages and in available jobs,
although they may want to work at their pre-
vious (higher) wages in their former jobs. Also
among the voluntarily unemployed are those
who spend their time searching the job market.
Because these workers, the real business cycle
theorists claim, are employed in job search - a
useful activity - they should not be considered
unemployed in an economic sense.Real business cycle theorists believe that if
unemployment and labor force statistics were
adjusted to measure only involuntary unemploy-
ment, most changes in employment during a
business cycle would be traced to changes in
the labor force. Unfortunately, sufficient data are
not availableto make the necessary adjustments.
The extent to which real business cycle theories
account for movements in employment remains
an open issue.
The role of money
In attributing business cycles mainly to non-
monetary causes, business cycle theories have
relegated monetary policy to a mainly passive
role. Whereas others have interpreted the close
historical relation between the money supply
and real output to mean that variations in the
money supply create business cycles, real busi-
ness cycle theorists hold that the supply of
money responds to the demand for money nec-
essitated by different levels of output. That is, the
level of output is directly connected to a
demand for transaction services. Money, in turn,
is demanded because of its usefulness in lower-
ing the transaction costs involved when pro-
ducers and consumers exchange goods and
services. As output expands or contracts during
a business cycle, so does the volume of transac-
tions, and therefore, the demand for money.
According to real business cycle theories, the
supply of money will change to accommodate
demand. An increase in the demand for money
would elicit an increase in the supply of money.
A rise in output, for example, would cause both
the demand for money and interest rates to rise.
As rates rise, banks would attempt to reduce
their holdings of excess reserves, which earn no
interest, by purchasing interest-earning assets
such as government securities, or by making
new private loans. Since all such new loans end
up as demand deposits (or their close substitutes)
at some bank, the money supply would expand
in response to a rise in market interest rates.
Real business cycle theorists argue that this
money supply expansion would occur even if
the monetary authority were to keep the total
reserves supplied to the banking system
unchanged. Consequently, broadly similar
movements in the monetary aggregates and real
GNP canresulrevenlTreserves supplied bythe
monetary authority to the banking system do not
vary over the business cycle.
The problem with this scenario is that banks
hold few excess reserves. Thus, their contribu-
tion to expanding the money supply by reducing
excess reserves is not likely to be very important.
Real business cycle theorists, however, also cite
the Federal Reserve's operating procedures to
help explain the close relation between money
growth and real output.
In most of the period after World War II, the
Federal Reserve used short-term interest rates as
a means of managing money growth. However,
the monetary authority also attempted to counter
at least part of the higher interest rates that
resulted from an increase in the demand for
money by increasing reserves to the banking sys-
tem. Given such a procedure, any disturbance
that causes real output to vary would also cause
the money stock to change in the same
direction.
Contributions
At this stage of their development, the most
important contribution of real business cycle
theories lies in their reminder that monetary
shocks are not the only potential causes of busi-
ness cycles. Their view of how the effects of the
recent drop in oil prices spread from oil-related
industries to entire geographic regions is one
case in point. A more complete understanding of
business cycles almost surely will require a
broader theory, incorporating key elements of
both monetary and real business cycle theories.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments' 2 207,823 - 4,587 5,334 2.6
Loans and Leases1 6 187,203 - 4,661 4,513 2.4
Commercial and Industrial 55,573 - 930 2,716 5.1
Real estate 67,224 - 514 1,159 1.7
Loans to Individuals 39,306 - 1,394 573 1.4
Leases 5,601 - 18 - 82 - 1.4
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 13,453 118 2,251 20.0
Other Securities2 7,167 - 46 - 1,431 - 16.6
Total Deposits 214,990 - 8,446 11,110 5.4
Demand Deposits 59,403 - 9,341 9,308 18.5
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 40,830 - 1,588 -5,199 - 11.2
OtherTransaction Balances4 20,285 337 4,660 29.8
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 135,302 559 - 2.858 - 2.0
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 46,761 - 308 811 1.7
Time Deposits in Amountsof
$100,000or more 32,276 441 - 6,032 - 15.7
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 26,255 - 898 1,850 7.5
TwoWeek Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











, Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.s. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percentchange